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Introduction
Voting  allows  citizens  to  participate  in  the  democratic  life  of  their  countries  or
organizations (political parties, trade unions, associations, professional life, etc.): they
can elect representatives or take decisions in a referendum.
Since the new millennium, electronic voting devices have appeared. In this study, we
address the question of ethics and electronic voting devices.
In the first part, we will define the main properties of a democratic election, providing a
typology of electronic devices and give a view on some legal documents pertaining to
the matter. In the second part, the ethics of voting will be evaluated: our methodology is
detailed, followed by an examination of pure paper-based elections, paperless electronic
voting  and  verifiable  electronic  voting.  The  new  concept  of  legally  operative
transparency is defined and a calendar for verifiable voting devices is proposed in the
third part.
1 - Context
1.1 - Democratic election
A democratic election1 can be seen as a way to take, collectively, a controversial decision
in a limited time. When a lot of people are involved in such a decision (this is the case,
for instance, when the population of a country chooses its president), the decision can
not be obtained by consensus. The main idea (following a simplified model) is to tally
the choices of individuals and declare elected the candidate with the largest number of
votes. One criteria to evaluate if an election is successful is the capacity to maintain a
peaceful  climate:  people  who  voted  for  a  candidate  that  lost  the  election  must  be
convinced that the election was free and fair in order to accept the defeat. If not, there is
a risk of disorder that may lead to riots, and the elected candidates can be constantly
challenged and their  legitimacy questioned.  To attain this  objective  of  peacekeeping,
elections must comply with a certain number of  principles. We can cite several. 
— Secrecy: each voter expresses her choice alone. In addition, she cannot prove how
she voted because that could expose her to vote selling or coercion. It is impossible to
link a ballot to the voter who cast it. The secrecy permits the voter to exercise her or his
choice freely.
— Integrity: the results of the election faithfully reflect the will of the voters.
— Equal suffrage: the 'one elector, one vote' principle2. 
1 In this article, the term election includes election of representatives and referenda.
2 Every person of voting age (and not deprived of his civil rights) can vote once. There are no other criteria
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— Universality: Each voter must be able to vote.
We make the assumption that one condition that must be met in order for an election to be defined
as ethical is that the peacekeeping goal is attained, so that electors have confidence that the election
had been fair. In order to be able to check if the principles cited above are respected, the election
must be observable and observed. This, last but not least, is the principle of transparency. 
We will present different definition of transparency and discuss this notion below in this article.
1.2 - Electronic voting
We consider as electronic voting any electronic system or device that ensures,  at the very
least, the tallying of votes. In addition, some are also used for the casting of votes, or to control
voters' identity.  There is a wide range of electronic voting devices that, in addition,  differs
from countries to countries. We present here the main families of them.
— Voting machines are also called  direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. They
record the choice of the voter who chooses by pushing a button, touching the screen or clicking on a
mouse, etc. and then count the votes electronically.
— Voting machines with a voter verifiable paper trail (VVPT) are voting machines which print a
ballot after an elector made her choice. This ballot can be verified by the voter. The ballots are
collected in a ballot box in the event of needing to be manually recounted (Mercuri, 2002).
— Internet  voting allows electors  to vote directly on the internet.  The voter  interacts  with an
internet vote server to identify herself and then sends her vote. We distinguish end to end (E2E)
verifiable and auditable internet voting from non-verifiable internet voting.
— Voting kiosks:  voters  can  vote  in  any polling  station.  Votes  are  registered  and tallied  by a
centralized electronic system. 
Figure 1. Ballot paper and sticky labels used in a hybrid postal election
limiting the right to vote as it was in France with the "censitaire" (a minimum income was required) or the denial of
voting rights to women, still current in some countries.
XXXXXXXXXXX
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elector identification:
       number
       barcode
only the crypted part is sticked
on the ballot.
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— Optical  mark  recognition  scanners:  the  voter  fills  her  ballot  with  a  pencil,  or  using  an
electronic device. The ballots are then inserted into a scanner that reads the ballots and tallies the
votes.
— Hybrid postal vote (figure 1) is the use of a scanner in the case of mail voting: the voter makes
her  choice,  sometimes  by identifying herself  and expressing her  choice  by using  labels  with  a
barcode that she sticks on the ballot. This ballot is consequently sent by mail. It will be read by a
scanner.
— Digital pens are equipped with a camera . The ballots are printed on a special paper. When an
elector votes, the camera registers its movements which will be interpreted as the expression of the
choice of the elector. 
— Voting boxes are used when all the electorate is in a same room. Each voter is provided with one
of these boxes. All electors vote at the same time by choosing a number that is sent to a computer.
— Phone: each voter phones a special number. She identifies herself and votes by pressing the
phone keys. 
— Short  Message Service (SMS):  to  vote,  an elector  sends a  message with  her  identification
number and her choice.
We propose a simple typology (figure 2) in which each device is situated relative to three
parameters:
— Voting in a voting poll (controlled environment) / remote voting;
— Votes are registered only electronically / votes are also registered on a paper ballot;
— The device controls / does not control equality by checking that each elector votes only once.
Figure 2. A typology of main electronic devices
We can see that all the electronic devices that are used in uncontrolled environment make the
necessary  controls  to  ensure  equality  (each  elector  cannot  vote  more  than  once).  In
consequence, they receive voter's identity and voter's choice. This situation can be perceived
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as a threat against the secrecy of the vote. 
1.3 - Legal documents
Two supranational organizations have produced texts on electronic voting: 
— The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) that includes
59 member states, 47 of which being members of the council of Europe. 
— The Office for Democratic  Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe that is comprised of 57 participating states.
The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
We first  studied these documents  while  focusing on the question of electronic  voting and
transparency.  Immediately,  it  appeared that electronic voting is very often associated with
security,  in the sense of the security of the electronic voting system itself,  a notion that is
absent when discussing paper based voting3.  For instance,  in the "Guidelines on elections"
edited  in  2002  (Venice  Commission,  2002),  the  first  sentence  about  electronic  voting  is
« electronic voting should be used only if  it  is  safe and reliable ».  These notions are defined
furthermore in the text: « Electronic voting methods must be secure and reliable. They are secure
if the system can withstand deliberate attack; they are reliable if they can function on their own,
irrespective  of  any  shortcomings  in  the  hardware  or  software. »  In  this  document,  the  Venice
Commission also recommends the use of VVAT, adding the concept of verifiability: « In order to
facilitate verification and a recount of votes in the event of an appeal ». In addition, it gives a
definition  of  transparency  adapted  to  electronic  voting  « the  system’s  transparency  must  be
guaranteed in the sense that it must be possible to check that it is functioning properly.  » and some
recommendations about the counting process of an election « counting should preferably take place
in polling stations; », « counting must be transparent. Observers, candidates' representatives and
the media must be allowed to be present. »
In 2004, the Venice Commission produced two documents entirely on electronic voting in which are
developed the themes we identified: security (which includes safety and reliability),  verifiability,
and transparency.
Four  statements are entitled « transparency »  in  the  Recommendation on legal,  operational  and
technical standards for e-voting (Venice Commission, 2004). 
20. Member states shall take steps to ensure that voters understand and have confidence in the e-
voting system in use.
21. Information on the functioning of an e-voting system shall be made publicly available.
22. Voters shall be provided with an opportunity to practise any new method of e-voting before,
and separately from, the moment of casting an electronic vote.
23. Any observers, to the extent permitted by law, shall be able to be present to observe and
comment on the e-elections, including the establishing of the results. 
We  note  that  only  the  last  one  concerns  the  transparency  of  counting  and  that  the  stage  of
registering votes is not concerned by any of these statements.
The  verifiability and  accountability are based on audits and certifications to verify that « the e-
voting system is working correctly and that all the necessary security measures have been taken  ».
The  security  is  developed  through  several  statements  detailing  that  the  e-voting  should  work
properly, should be audited, should be accessed by a limited number of persons , etc.
The second document is a report that addresses the question of the compatibility of remote voting
(paper  based  or  electronic)  with  the  standards  of  the  Council  of  Europe  (Venice  Commission,
3 When security is  invoked in this  manual,  it  is  only about  the  protection  of  the  poll  station,  by police  or  the
intervention by the security forces in the event of trouble.
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2004b). It reiterates that « electronic voting should only be used if it is safe and reliable » and that
« The system’s transparency must be guaranteed » in the sense that « it must be possible to check
that it is functioning properly ». The fact that a voter has the possibility to check his or her vote
immediately after casting it is presented as a measure to limit the risk of fraud. This report insists on
the importance of taking measures to ensure that the principle of secret suffrage is protected.
In 2010, the Venice Commission published a handbook on e-voting (Venice Commission, 2010)
which  develops  the  key  steps  in  the  implementation  of  e-enabled  elections.  Again,  it  is
repeated that « without transparency states cannot guarantee that an e-enabled election was
conducted according to the democratic principles of free and fair elections. » One year later, two
Guidelines  on  Certification  of  E-voting  Systems  (Venice  Commission, 2011)  and  on
Transparency  of  E-enabled  Elections  have  been  published  (Venice  Commission, 2011b).
Certification is presented as a key element to reinforce citizens’ confidence in the security and
reliability of  e-voting systems.  Transparency concerns the access to reports by authorized
persons (international observers, stakeholders for instance), the observation of the testing of
the  system and  the  use  of  a  second  medium that  is  software  independent  to  control  the
results. Finally, a new definition of transparency is provided : « the concept of determining how
and why information is conveyed through various means. »
It appears that, since 2002, the Venice commission has been organizing the legal environment
in order to spread electronic voting systems. 
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
The  ODIHR  has  encountered  electronic  voting  systems  during  its  election  observation
missions and, at least since 2005, appreciates that electronic-voting systems with no voter-
verified paper audit trail or other manual-audit capacity are « possible problems to be aware
of » because they are challenges to the transparency and accountability of an election process
(ODIHR, 2005), (ODIHR, 2010). 
In  2013,  the  ODIHR  edited  a  Handbook  For  the  Observation  of  New Voting  Technologies
(ODIHR, 2013). This manual declares :
« Transparency is a cornerstone of the OSCE election-related commitments, as it is necessary
to verify that elections take place in accordance with the law and with democratic principles.
Election  observation  is  a  key  aspect  of  transparency,  recognized  by  paragraph  8  of  the
Copenhagen  Document.  Political  parties,  candidates  and  observers  should  have  the
opportunity to observe the work of election authorities at all levels, and especially the voting,
counting and tabulation processes. »
This handbook outlines that observations must be meaningful and that this is not the case
when observing voters and officials operating machines. It advocates that observers should
have  full  access  to  documentation  about  the  system,  including  certification  and  testing
reports.
Concerning  security  issue,  the  manual  remarks  that  « a  key  difference  [with  paper-based
voting] is  that attacks on NVT may require technological skills  and significant resources not
possessed by the typical voter to be detected or observed. » and advises that observers should
verify  that  robust  security  measures  against  potential  threats  have  been  taken.  These
measures are not listed exhaustively, but a few examples are given, such as, in the case of DRE
voting  machines,  controlling  that  USB ports  are  not  easily  accessible  in  order  to  prevent
physical  tampering,  storing  and  transporting  devices  in  a  secure  manner  under  defined
protocols. 
For devices that are connected to the Internet, the manual insists on the possible loss of votes
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and the prevention against  illegitimate access or the possibility that  individuals who have
access  to  the  system  encounter  the  opportunity  for  internal  manipulation.  Again,  some
security procedures are advocated that must be « both effective and fully implemented ».  In
addition,  some  measures  should  be  adopted  to  guard  voters'  computers  against  possible
attack that may, for instance, change their choice or steal their usernames and passwords.
Testing the system is considered as important when considering security measures, even if it
is  also explained that  « testing is  never  a  guarantee that  the  NVT [new voting technology]
system is fully secure or that it will work properly on election day. »
The manual gives also some directions in order to evaluate the certification process (which is
prior to the vote) and the process of verifying the results: post-election audit, collection and
counting of ballots for devices with printed ballots4.
Transparency is then redefined: it concerns access to documentation and to the source code,
observation  of  the  electronic  voting  process,  of  the  activities  of  election  administrators,
vendors, of the process of certification, testing and auditing, etc. This new definition contrasts
with the necessity of meaningful observation that stands at the beginning the document and
that  is  illustrated  by  an  example  focusing  on  the  observation  of  the  counting  process  in
progress: 
« in paper ballot systems counting cannot be considered transparent if observers are present
during the counting but are kept at such a distance that they cannot see the content of ballots
and cannot verify that votes are being counted honestly.
3 Evaluating the ethics of electronic voting 
3.1 Methodology 
As stated Michael  Saward (2003),  « we need a  fresh view of  democratic  theory »  in  which
« democratic  principles  are  primarily  thing  we  do5,  rather  than  things  or  statuses  that  are
conferred ». Following this direction, we will examine the reality of several voting devices to
determine if they are transparent. Our strategy will be to develop a worst-case scenario in
which  security  breaches  (fraud  or  unreliability)  would  cause  the  modification  of  a  vast
amount of votes. We will then try to answer the question: would these discrepancies have
been seen or stayed invisible? We will focus on the two stages of registering votes and tallying
them.
In addition, we will consider if the legal texts we presented effectively address this problem.
Thus, we will focus on transparency and will not investigate the security of electronic voting
because we previously proved that a « promise of security is not able to compensate for the
loss of direct transparency. » (Enguehard, 2014)
3.2 Pure paper-based elections
We  did  not  present  pure  paper-based  elections  that  do  not  use  any  electronic  device  to
register or tally the votes in detail because this is not the scope of this article. Nevertheless, we
will examine this family of elections in order to compare it with electronic approaches
There are many different paper-based voting organizations,  we describe here a simplified
model:  The  electors  vote  with  paper  ballots  (chosen  inside  a  booth  and  slipped  into  an
4 Curiously, it is stated that « For audits, it is likely that only a certain percentage of paper records will be checked  »
while it should be obviously more accurate to check all the paper records. 
5 The author uses bold characters in its own article.
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envelope to keep the secrecy of the vote). Each elector then deposits her envelope in a voting
box. The fact that an elector did not vote before is controlled in order to respect the unicity
principle (for instance, each voter signs on a register). At the end of the voting period, the
ballots are counted publicly, i.e. under the eyes of the public.
Within  this  organization,  all  the  information is  registered  on neutral  material:  ballots  are
made in paper printed with ink and could not modify themselves; the ballot box is made of
wood  or  transparent  plexiglass  (in  France).  The  neutral  property  of  the  material  used  to
register the votes is crucial:  even if  the stage of the voters making their choice cannot be
observed, if  the ballot box has been properly watched, it  is  certain that it  contains all  the
ballots deposited by the voters without any change. The tallying being processed publicly by
several persons is transparent in the sense of acting democracy: people can see the counting
and sometimes (in France for instance) participate in this operation.
Our worst-case scenario can now be examined. A first possibility to modify a vast amount of
votes could happen by altering the content of the voting box (or by exchanging the voting box
with another one) during the election period. The second possibility takes place during the
tallying.  The opening of the voting box represents an opportunity to maliciously change a
group of envelopes by another one. Again, this stage must be closely monitored by the people
present. If this is the case, the fraudster can be caught6.
It appears that the possible undermining of the integrity of the election could occur with a
great magnitude only if all the persons that are present in the voting station during the fraud
conspire with the fraudster. These threats can be thwarted by the presence of several persons
belonging to different parties, that constantly oversee that there is no unauthorized tampering
with  the voting  box  or  during  the tallying.  We remark that  these  people  who ensure  the
smooth running of these two stages by their attentive presence do not need high qualifications
in any subject. 
3.2 - Paperless electronic voting
Paperless electronic voting includes all devices used in elections without any ballot paper:
DRE voting machines,  non-verifiable internet voting,  voting boxes,  voting kiosks,  voting by
phone or by SMS.
All these electronic devices have in common that the choices expressed by the electors are
transformed  in  order  to  be  registered  and  then  tallied.  For  instance,  with  DRE  voting
machines, an elector votes by pressing a finger on a button, this strength is converted into an
electrical signal which is then converted into an electronic information expressed using the
binary base7. Finally, all these pieces of information that represent ballots will be transformed
again during the tallying phase to produce some election results. These operations are done at
an electronic level that cannot be directly observed by human eyes. These processes could
malfunction because of a bug or a fraud and produce electoral results that do not reflect the
sum of the voters'choices. 
Would it be possible to know if some malfunctioning happened? Three possible pathways can
be followed:
— Printing a log file
The electronic device could print a record of its activities which allows to follow and check the
6 Examples are not rare. We can cite the failed attempt of fraud that happened during parliamentary elections in
Perpignan, France in 2012. The president of a polling station added some signatures on the signing register. He was
found with several envelopes with ballots hidden in his pockets and his socks. The election had been canceled and
the fraudster sentenced (Le Monde, 2011).
7 Encoded with the 0 and 1 symbols.
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transformations from each vote from registering until the tallying. This approach, very common
when computing, is the production of a log file. Unfortunately, this file will lead to know each
elector's vote and is therefore not suitable to a free election.
— Testing
Some tests can be done. But testing a device before or after its real use could not guarantee that it
functions  properly  during  the  election  period.  In  computer  science  the  limits  of  the  testing
procedures are well known: it is impossible to test all the possible interactions between users and a
computer and some behavior could change in function of external parameters such as, for instance,
the calendar.
— Proving a program
Proving a  program is  a  mathematical  method  that  virtually  takes  into  account  all  the  possible
interactions between a program and its environment. This approach can be followed for a program,
but is not possible, at this point of the computer science, to prove an entire system composed with
different  hardware  and  software  parts.  We  can  consider  DRE  voting  machines  which  are  the
simplest electronic voting devices: some parts of the device may be modified during the election
period  (for  instance,  a  micro-code  that  changes  the  tallying  program  could  be  injected  when
plugging  a  printer  and  be  self-erased  after  the  tally).  Of  course,  this  approach  is  completely
unsuitable  for  voting  devices  that  take  place  in  uncontrolled  environments:  electors'  phones  or
computers cannot be checked. 
The testing or proving approaches also encounter another  difficulty:  checking that  the program
which is working (the executable program) during the election corresponds to the program that has
been tested/proved8 is a difficult problem that does not have any robust solution at this moment.
That's  why the access  to  the source code by the public  or  an audit  commission should not  be
presented as a measure that enhance the transparency of the election.
We conclude that a malfunction could occur during an election and stay invisible, even if a large
amount of ballots are modified by this malfunctioning.
This analysis leads to questioning the auditing approach that is strongly encouraged by the Venice
Commission and the ODIHR. Audits can only test the device, or a part of it, observe some pieces of
programs and be informed of some organizational details about the companies that build and sell e-
voting devices. These investigations are not sufficient in order to find all the potential flaws that
could jeopardize the electoral results, including those that could affect an important part  of the
ballots, while staying undetected. 
Paperless voting devices are an opaque mode of voting in the sense that it is impossible to
know if the transformation of the ballots changed the choices expressed by the voters during
an election9. These devices offer neither transparency to the electors, nor anybody else: the
candidates, the official members of polling stations, the technicians who manage the voting
system, the judge that should intervene in a case of electoral disputes, etc., or any independent
authority that audited the software. In addition, it is common that the authority in charge of
audits only produces reports which are not public because of the protection of commercial
and  industrial  property.  It  constitutes  a  second  opacity.  A  double  opacity  is  not
transparency. 
A French story
In France, the audit reports about the voting machines that are used since 2004 by the
electorate of some cities (Enguehard, 2013) were not accessible. After a legal dispute one of
8 The interpreter or the compiler used to transform the source code into an executable program can also be flawed.
9 Enguehard and Lehn (2009) compares in detail three  remote voting methods: postal voting, internet voting and
hybrid postal voting and concludes that « that the automatisation of treatments combined with the dematerialisation
of the objects used during an election tends to substitute visible vulnerabilities of a lesser magnitude by invisible
and widespread vulnerabilities. »
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these reports, concerning the Nedap voting machines authorized in France, had been provided
to the litigant. It revealed that the devices have been authorized despite not complying with
several criteria defined by a decree. Even if these discrepancies were to be judged as minor, the
observation  mission  of  the  OSCE noted  that  « This  raised  concerns  that  the  certification
companies have too much discretion in determining the acceptable amount of variance in
meeting each certification criteria and in determining whether some criteria are relevant at
all. » (ODIHR, 2007)
3.3 Verifiable electronic voting 
Because paperless electronic voting is not transparent, and that any major flaws affecting the
electronically registered ballots or their tally could remain invisible, some researches have
been tackled  to  specify  the  concept  of  verifiable  electronic  voting  (Gharadaghy,  Volkamer,
2010). Two verification points have been defined:
– Individual verification: each voter checks that her vote had been rightly encoded, registered
and tallied.
– Universal verification: anybody can check that only legitimate votes have been recorded and
tallied, and that this tally is accurate.
We will examine these two stages and then bring a legal analysis.
Individual verification 
When the voter uses a digital pencil or marks her ballot paper herself, we can consider that
she checks that her vote had been rightly encoded. But she gets no information about the
registration and the count of her vote.
– Individual verification with VVPT
When using a VVPT voting machine, the voter does not produce her ballot paper herself: a
ballot  is  printed  by  the  voting  machine,  and  the  voter  is  invited  to  check  if  the  printed
information is the choice she expressed when pressing a button. She can confirm or cancel her
vote. Following confirmation, the ballot is then conveyed to a ballot box whose content could
be checked during the universal verification step. Again, a voter gets no information about the
registration and the count of her vote.
This individual verification step is crucial because if the ballot conveyed in the ballot box does
not  correspond  to  the  voter's  choice,  the  universal  verification  would  be  useless.
Unfortunately, it has been observed that many voters do not check the printed ballot that is
presented (Herrnson, 2006): « Despite all  the publicity given to the paper trail issue,  voters
seemed largely to ignore the paper record. »
– Individual verification with an "end to end auditable and verifiable" (E2E) internet voting
system 
As far as we know, the Hélios voting system (Adida, 2009) is the only internet voting system
that was developed in order to be "end to end auditable and verifiable". It allows an elector to
test if an encrypted ballot conveys her choice. But she cannot check the ballot she sent to the
centralized computer (that receives all the ballots) because a voter must not get any proof of
her vote that would expose her to coercion.
The system sends to each elector an electronically signed document that allows to check that a
vote has been tallied. 
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Universal verification
– Universal verification of electronic voting devices with paper ballots (VVPT, digital pencil,
optical mark recognition scanner or hybrid postal voting)
The universal verification is the recount of all  collected ballot papers.  Usually,  the recount
concerns only a part of the devices that have been used. Thus, some of them won't have their
results  checked.  The  time  at  which  the  devices  to  be  checked  are  designated,  and  the
organization of the checking must be precisely defined in order to get a credible verification.
For instance, devices to be checked should be chosen after the voting period (to not give any
clue about the devices that won't be checked) and the recount should take place immediately,
in the polling station, without moving the voting box. 
– Universal verification with an E2E internet voting system 
Some cryptographic algorithms allow to achieve the tally of electronic ballot without accessing
the  identity  of  the  voter  associated  with  each  ballot  (Gharadaghy,  Volkamer,  2010).  Such
verification  can  be  done  with  Hélios  but  this  complex  operation  is  not  accessible  to  all
electors.
Legal analysis
The individual and universal verifications can lead to encountering some flaws, but would
such flaws be taken into account during a legal dispute? The verification stages we presented
above have been defined by computer scientists that are familiar with bugs: if the testing of
software does not give the expected results, an error must be searched and corrected. 
But, in the case of elections, this is a judge that decides if  a voting device was flawed, not
computer scientists. The individual verification procedure allows a voter to notice a flaw, but
she could not prove it.  The voting device is more transparent than a non-verifiable voting
device,  but  this  transparency could have no legal  consequence:  even if  a  large amount  of
voters were to encounter some changes in their ballot, they could not present any proof of
their observation10, and thus electors will carry on voting on this voting device. As a large part
of the voters don't check their vote, the voting device could have registered a lot of ballots that
do not meet the voter's choice and not been declared as faulty.
The universal verification of electronic voting devices with paper ballots is also inadequate for
a legal evaluation because the judge needs to possess some statistical abilities to extrapolate
the verification results obtained on a few devices for the entire group of devices that have
been used (but not all verified).
Because of these problems we define the new concept of  legally effective transparency and
introduce some additional controls that concern verifiable voting devices and that constitute a
calendar for verifiable voting devices. 
– Definition: 
The  legally effective transparency  of a voting device exists if any report of a flaw during an
election is accompanied by the production of a material proof that could be taken into account
by a justice court.
– Calendar for verifiable voting devices
As we explained, it is crucial that the voters really check their vote in order to avoid that a flaw
modifying many ballots  would stay legally  invisible.  It  appears  necessary to define  a new
calendar that takes into account these controls. This calendar is divided into several steps:
1. Electors make their choice.
2. Electors check that their choice has not been changed and has been tallied.
3. A temporary tally is calculated, based on the checked ballots (non checked ballots are not taken
10 In addition, this situation could also make some rumors rise, undermining the confidence in the electoral system.
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into account).
4. Universal verification is processed.
5. Definitive results are claimed.
These  suggestions  should  be evaluated  and  completed.  There  is  a  need  for  new research
studies to define points of control in order to achieve the legally effective transparency.
Conclusion
In this article we investigate transparency because it is the cornerstone of democracy. Many
more subjects should be studied. In particular the expected benefits of electronic voting, often
claimed, should be evaluated.
Accessibility is supposed to be enhanced (in France, people are supposed to be able to vote
alone  on  voting  machines,  whatever  handicap  they  have),  but  some  studies  suggest  the
contrary,  even  with  people  without  any  handicap  (Michel,  de  Abreu,  Brangier,  2007),
(Braconnier,  Dormagen,  Rocha,  2013).  The  capacity  of  increasing  turnout  is  in  discussion
(Beckert,  Lindner,  Goos,  Hennen,  Aichholzer,  Strauß, 2010):  Internet  voting  would  favor  the
participation of people who have a tendency to vote, but would not involve people who do not
vote except « a“curiosity effect” which can appear when i-voting is used for the first time ». The
lower election administration costs are also in question. In Belgium it appears that electronic
voting costs more than 1,37 euro per elector while paper based voting costs only 0,1 euro per
elector  (Sirlereau,  2013).  A  French  senatorial  report  also  outlined  also  the  necessity  to
evaluate such costs and also environmental costs (Sénat, 2014). Even the improvement of the
accuracy of counting should not be accepted as an obvious fact.  A study conducted in France
(Enguehard & Graton 2014) compared the number of votes and number of signatures on the
signing sheet of more than one hundred thousand poll stations for all the political elections
from 2007 to 2012. It showed that these two numbers, which should be equal in a polling
station, are sometimes different, and that these differences are 3 to 5 times more frequent
when voting machines are used compared to paper-based voting.
DRE voting machines have been used since 2004 in France. In 2014, local elections took place
in March. At least six legal disputes on the use of DRE voting machines11 have begun, even if
such disputes have never led to the cancelling of an election. The election results appeared
strange to people: too regular amongst the polling stations, or too close to the last election
results, etc. For the parliamentary election in 2012 French living abroad could vote by internet
in  11  districts:  five  legal  disputes  on  the  electronic  voting  subject  arose.  This  increasing
number of legal disputes may mean that, because of the non-transparency, the confidence in
the electoral system is decreasing.
It appears that electronic voting devices that are used at the present time could allow for some
massive  flaws  to  occur  without  any  legal  treatment  of  these  facts,  even  when  they  are
verifiable electronic devices. This lack of transparency could undermine the public confidence
and lead to political  and social  disorder by affecting the peacekeeping role of  transparent
elections.
Decisions about electronic devices should consider the double question: what are the risks of
using electronic voting devices? / what are the risks of not using electronic voting devices?
The reality is brutally different: electronic voting is a market that some like to enhance to get
11 In Marignane, Orange, Palavas-les-Flots, Saint-Pol-sur-mer, Sèvres and Villeneuve-le-Roi.
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